The Context of Texas Politics

The San Jacinto Monument near Beaumont commemorates the 1836 battle in which Texans won their independence from Mexico.

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INTRODUCTION

Much changed in Texas between the era in which General Sheridan made his oft-quoted evaluation of the state and the era in which the editors of *The Economist* made theirs. In 1855, Texas was poor and sparsely settled and offered few civilized comforts to a soldier assigned to garrison an outpost against Native American raids. Today, Texas is the nation’s second most populous state, with four-fifths of the population living in cities or suburbs. The state leads the country in consuming energy and producing semiconductors, among other distinctions. Yet, as we shall see, in some ways, the state has changed little since Sheridan’s time. Texas is a constantly developing mix of old and new.

Old habits of thought and behavior evolved to meet the problems of the nineteenth century, when Texas was settled by Americans of western European background. These habits persist today, despite serious new problems created in the latter decades of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first centuries. As Texans prepare themselves to meet the challenges of the future, they have to ask themselves if the habits and institutions they have inherited are up to the job.

This chapter begins with a summary of the history of Texas, with an emphasis on important political events and the development of the economy. Next some of the basic principles of democratic theory are discussed, along with an explanation of why it is vital to understand them, and a brief look at one of the problems in a democracy is provided. Two discussions then situate Texas within the American federal system and the international arena, after which the focus shifts to the political culture of Texas with examination of some historically crucial social and political attitudes. The economy of Texas is covered next, including the way it interacts with the state’s political system. Then, as an introduction to some discussions later in the book, the origin and distribution of the state’s population are considered. Finally, the chapter ends with a brief outline of the agenda for the rest of the book.
Like a human being, a state is partly what it is because of what it has experienced. A review of Texas history will highlight the background and context of the themes, institutions, behaviors, and events we discuss in this book.1

The Earliest Days

Humans have inhabited Texas for much longer than there has been such a thing as a state. Skull fragments found near Midland (dubbed “Midland Minnie”) and a complete female skeleton discovered near Leander have been dated at 10,000 to 13,000 years old; a larger Clovis period (10,000–9,000 B.C.) site has been excavated in Denton County.

At the time of the first European exploration in the sixteenth century, perhaps 30,000 to 40,000 Native Americans inhabited what is now Texas, and some estimates run as high as 130,000. Among the major groups were the Caddo tribes of North and East Texas, Tonkawas in Central Texas, Karankawas along the coast, Coahuiltecans from the Rio Grande to what is now San Antonio, Lipan Apaches and Comanches in West Texas, and Jumanos in the Trans Pecos region. Determined to keep their lands, they violently resisted European settlement. Westward advancement in Texas cost seventeen White lives per mile. One can only guess at the cost to the Native Americans, although it was probably much higher.

As early as 1519, just twenty-seven years after the European discovery of the New World and a century before the English Pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock, Spanish explorer Alonzo Alvarez de Pineda mapped the entire Gulf Coast. Several expeditions followed, but Spanish activity was not extensive until 1685, when the French explorer Rene Robert Caullière de Sieur La Salle built a small fort in what is now South Texas. This threat of competition from their imperial rivals spurred the Spanish to establish a series of missions beginning in 1690. The purposes of these missions were to extend the sphere of Spanish domination and civil law and to convert Native Americans to Christianity. Spanish influence extended across South Texas from Louisiana to New Mexico, and by the time of the American Revolution in 1776, about 2,300 Native Americans had been baptized.

However, by the early nineteenth century, Spanish power was already waning as a result of economic and military factors. After one abortive attempt, Mexico achieved independence from Spain in 1821. By that year, despite the centuries of Spanish influence, there were only three permanent European settlements in Texas—San Antonio, Nacogdoches, and Goliad—and the European population had declined to 7,000 during the previous thirty years. Although their numbers were relatively small, Spaniards and Mexicans left rich and indelible influences on Texas through their language, law, religion, and culture.

Anglo-American Colonization

Colonization from the south did not succeed in Texas because of shortsighted economic policies. The Spanish government exploited the few settlers by paying poor prices for their cattle and other products and, at the same time, by
charging them high prices for trade goods. As a result, few settlers moved to the giant province.

Texas was potentially much more attractive to settlers from the neighboring United States. There, frontier land was sold to would-be settlers, but in Texas, land was free if one could get a government grant. Because the Spanish government had failed to persuade Mexican citizens to colonize the area, it was nervous about expansionist impulses in the United States. Spain decided to gamble that it could acculturate Anglo settlers and use them to protect Mexican interests against the growing, rambunctious democracy to the north.

Moses Austin, a native of Connecticut, abandoned his unsuccessful business activities in Missouri and turned his attention to Texas. Moses died after filing a formal application for settlement with the viceroy of Mexico in 1819. He was succeeded by his son, Stephen F. Austin, who received a generous land grant, as well as permission to bring in 300 families for colonization. The first settlements were at Columbus on the Colorado River and at Washington-on-the-Brazos. As impresario, or agent, Austin had wide powers over his colony to establish commercial activity, organize a militia, and dispense justice.

Other colonies quickly followed, and the non-Native American population jumped from 7,000 to more than 35,000 between 1821 and 1836. The great majority of the settlers came in good faith, intending to take the oath of allegiance to Mexico and be good Mexican citizens. However, the cultural differences they encountered made this difficult. Not only was Spanish the official language, but also the colonists, mostly Protestant, were required to accept Roman Catholicism. In addition, some colonists continued to keep Black slaves, although this practice was illegal in Mexico.

Furthermore, the new Mexican nation was suffering from violent political instability, and policy toward Texas was both inconsistent and made 900 miles away in Mexico City by men who knew little about conditions in the area. Moreover, Anglos tended to regard themselves as culturally superior to Mexicans and vice versa. Alienation between Texas and Mexico grew, much as alienation between the colonists and the British had grown prior to the American Revolution two generations earlier.

An Ideal, but Unpaid, Job

In 2005 the Texas legislature established the position of official state historian. The job of the person holding the title, which comes with considerable prestige but no pay, consists of advising government leaders and promoting the understanding of and teaching of Texas history. The current state historian, appointed by Governor Perry in 2009, is Light Cummins, professor of history at Austin College in Sherman. Cummins, who describes himself as a “native Texan born in Connecticut,” has just finished his eighth book, a biography of Stephen F. Austin’s sister, Emily.

CHAPTER ONE: THE CONTEXT OF TEXAS POLITICS

Revolution

The Mexican government now feared further Anglo-American settlement and acted to curtail it. The settlers responded with demands for concessions, including the right to use the English language in public business and the separation of Texas from the state of Coahuila. Austin was imprisoned in Mexico City for a time, and conditions degenerated. What followed is known to virtually every schoolchild in the state: Texas’s war for independence.

The most celebrated engagement during the war was the battle in San Antonio in March 1836 in which a few Anglos and Mexican Texans held the Alamo against a much larger Mexican force for eleven days before being massacred. Nevertheless, although it makes a stirring story, the Alamo was not a decisive engagement. That distinction belongs to the Battle of San Jacinto, which took place between the new Texas army, led by Sam Houston, and the Mexican army, led by General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, on April 21 of that year. Surprising the Mexicans while they took a siesta in the afternoon, the Texans routed them in a mere eighteen minutes, captured Santa Anna, and ordered him to sign a document agreeing to their independence or be executed. Santa Anna signed, but repudiated the treaty as soon as he was safely across the border. Texans, however, considered themselves independent, and the Republic of Texas became a reality.

The history of the republic, though eventful, was short. Independence brought sudden growth, and the population rose rapidly to about 140,000. The new nation struggled, however. The Mexicans invaded twice, capturing San Antonio both times before being repulsed. Resistant Native Americans continued to cause severe problems as well. Soon the nation found itself in debt and with a depreciating currency.

Sentiment for annexation by the United States had always been strong, and on December 29, 1845, the U.S. Congress voted to admit Texas into the Union as the twenty-eighth state. This was one of those rare events in history: an independent nation voluntarily gave up its sovereignty to become part of another nation. Unlike other states, Texas retained the title to all of its public lands when it accepted statehood.
Early Statehood

At the time Texas became a state, a final peace treaty with Mexico had never been signed, and the Mexican government still considered Texas a rebellious province. The annexation of the area by the United States precipitated the Mexican War. This conflict was relatively short and decisive. The first engagement took place at Palo Alto, near present-day Brownsville, on May 8, 1846, and Mexico City fell a year and four months later on September 14, 1847. Under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed in early 1848, the defeated nation relinquished all claim to Texas and, in return for $15 million, ceded all territory west of Texas and south of Oregon to the United States. One can only wonder what the value of this vast tract is today.

At the time Texas became independent in 1836, the republic was home to about 5,000 Black slaves. No political parties, as such, existed in the Republic of Texas. Sam Houston, the hero of the Battle of San Jacinto, was the dominant political figure, and political debate generally divided along pro-Houston and anti-Houston lines. By joining the United States, however, the Lone Star State was plunged into the political controversy over slavery. That issue simmered at higher and higher temperatures until it boiled over with the election of an antislavery Republican, Abraham Lincoln, as president in 1860.

To the extent that Texans thought about national politics, most were Democrats. Fearful that Republican control would mean a federal effort to emancipate their slaves, the southern states withdrew from the Union. Texas seceded in February 1861 and joined the new Confederacy in March.

During the Civil War, Texans fought at home, on an expedition into New Mexico, and in large numbers in West Virginia, Tennessee, and elsewhere. Southern troops and southern generals were usually superior to their northern counterparts and won many battles. The agricultural South, however, was outgunned, outmanned, and outsupplied by the industrial North,

How Many Heroes?

Although Texans are certain that the men who gave their lives at the Alamo were heroes, they are not quite sure how many of them there were. For most of the twentieth century, the Daughters of the Republic of Texas maintained a roster of “Heroes of the Battle of the Alamo” that contained 183 names, mainly Anglo. Over the decades, a few Spanish-surnamed defenders were added, so that by the early 1990s the “official” number of heroes was 189.

Recent scholarly research, however, has suggested that the victorious Mexican army counted as many as 257 Texan bodies after the battle. Because of the incomplete nature of the Mexican records, it may be impossible to come up with a definitive number.

and southern political leadership was inferior to Lincoln’s. The U.S. president issued the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing the slaves, on January 1, 1863—an act that persuaded European powers not to enter the war on the South’s behalf.

The North ground down the South’s ability to wage war over four years until the Confederacy fell apart in the spring of 1865. With the defeat of the rebellion, federal troops landed at Galveston on June 19, 1865, proclaiming the freedom of the state’s 250,000 slaves. “Juneteenth” is still celebrated by African American Texans as Emancipation Day.

Post–Civil War Texas

Confusion and bitterness followed the Civil War. Despite President Lincoln’s stated policy of “with malice toward none, with charity for all,” the reaction in Texas, as in other parts of the South, was to continue to oppose national policy even though the war was over. Confederate officials and sympathizers were elected to state and local office, and Black Codes that severely restricted the activities of the former slaves were passed by state legislatures.

This defiance by the defeated South strengthened the position of the Radical Republicans in Congress and caused a hardening of policy, and Lincoln’s assassination prevented him from moderating their desire to punish the states of the defunct Confederacy for their rebellion. During the period known as Reconstruction, military government was imposed on the South, and former Confederate officials and soldiers were largely excluded from voting and from holding public office. These actions by the federal government intensified the hostility with which most White Texans viewed the Republican Party. African Americans, as one might expect, voted for the Republicans, giving White Texans even more reason to support the Democrats.

Political activity by the freed slaves also gave rise to the Ku Klux Klan in Texas and throughout the South. Klan members met in secret, bound themselves by oath, and frequently wore hoods to conceal their identities. Their purpose was to keep African Americans in a position of great inferiority. Their methods included intimidation, violence, and sometimes murder.

The best remembered governorship of this Reconstruction period was that of E. J. Davis, one of a number of Texans who had fought for the Union during the war. A Republican, Davis held office from 1870 to 1874. Using the substantial powers granted by the state’s Constitution of 1869, Davis acted like a true chief executive and implemented policies consistent with the philosophy of the Radical Republicans in Washington. To his credit, Davis reformed the penal system and greatly improved public education. To his discredit, during his tenure, state indebtedness increased considerably, and there were allegations of financial impropriety. But whatever the merits of his administration, to White Texans he was a traitorous agent of the hated Yankees.

In 1873, after political restrictions against former Confederate officials and soldiers were removed, a Democrat, Richard Coke, defeated Davis in his reelection bid by a two-to-one margin. Just as important as the return of the Democratic Party to power was the repudiation of the Constitution of 1869 and its replacement with Texas’s current basic law, the Constitution of 1876. The adoption of this document represented the end of Reconstruction and a substantial return to the traditional principles of the Jeffersonian Democrats, including very limited government and low taxes.
The Late Nineteenth Century

Texas did not suffer the physical destruction that burdened other Confederate states, and economic recovery and development came quickly after the Civil War. The Hollywood version of this era in Texas is one of cowboys, cattle drives, and range wars. There is some basis for the mythical view of post-Civil War Texas as a land of ranches and trail drives, for between 1866 and 1880 four million cattle were driven “north to the rails.” Nevertheless, the actual foundation of the state’s economy was King Cotton. In East Texas, the fields were worked largely by African Americans, and in West Texas, by Mexican Americans. Cotton remained the cash crop and principal export well into the twentieth century. However, in terms of the self-image of Texans, the myth of cow culture has been far more important than the reality of cotton farming.

Texas has few navigable rivers, and therefore transportation was a major problem. Because of the size of the state, thousands of miles of railroad track were laid. In 1881, embarrassed officials discovered that the state legislature had given the railroads a million more acres of land for rights-of-way than were available, and the land-grant laws were repealed. Nevertheless, in 1888, railroad construction in Texas exceeded the total for all of the other states and territories combined. In all, more than 32 million acres of land were given to the railroads, thus establishing early on the easy relationship between the state government and large corporations.

Race relations were difficult statewide, but particularly in East Texas. “Jim Crow laws” severely limiting the civil rights of African Americans began to make their appearance, and violence against the former slaves was common and often fatal. Between 1870 and 1900, an estimated 500 African Americans died as a result of mob violence, much of it led by the Ku Klux Klan. Although citizenship is much more equal today than it was in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there is still ethnic conflict in Texas, and some parts of the state continue to display “Old South” racist patterns of behavior.

Throughout most of the final quarter of the nineteenth century, conservative Democrats maintained control of the state. Their rule was based on White supremacy and the violent emotional reaction to the Radical Republican Reconstruction era. But other political parties and interest groups rose to challenge them.

With the penetration of the state by railroads and the increase in manufacturing came organized labor. Most notable were the militant Knights of...
Labor, which struck the Texas & Pacific Railroad in 1885 and won concessions. Another strike a year later, however, turned violent. Governor John Ireland used troops, ostensibly to protect railroad property, and the strike was broken.

In the optimistic and growing economy of the 1880s, labor unions were less acceptable in the South than elsewhere. In Texas, they were viewed as “Yankee innovations” and “abominations.” Although a combination of capital was called a corporation and given approval by the state to operate under a charter, combinations of labor, called unions, were frequently labeled restraints of trade by the courts and forbidden to operate. Laws and executive actions also restricted union activities. These biases in favor of capital and against organized labor are still common in Texas.

More important than early labor unions was the agrarian movement. By the 1870s and 1880s, many of those who worked the land in Texas—whether White, African American, or Mexican American—were tenant farmers. Having to borrow money for seed and supplies, they worked all year to pay back what they owed and rarely broke even. Money and credit were scarce even for those who owned land, and railroad rates were artificially high.

The National Grange, or Patrons of Husbandry, was founded in 1867 in Washington, D.C., to try to defend farmers against this sort of economic hardship. The first chapter was established in Texas in 1872 and the organization grew quickly. Grangers were active in local politics, and the state organization lobbied the legislature on issues relevant to farmers. The Grange not only was influential in establishing Texas Agricultural & Mechanical College (now A&M University) and other educational endeavors but also played a significant role in writing the Constitution of 1876.

James S. Hogg, representing a new breed of Texas politician, was elected governor in 1890 and 1892. The first native Texan to hold the state’s highest office, Hogg was not a Confederate veteran. He presided over a brief period of reform that saw the establishment of the Railroad Commission, regulation of monopolies, limitations on alien ownership of land, and attempts to protect the public by regulating stocks and bonds. Unfortunately, it was also an era that saw the enactment of additional Jim Crow laws, including the requirement for segregation of African Americans from Whites on railroads.

Jim Hogg left the governorship in 1895, and the brief period of agrarian reform waned, due in large measure to changes in the membership of the legislature. In 1890, about half the representatives were farmers, but by 1901, two-thirds were lawyers and businessmen. The representation of these professions is similarly high today.

Both major political parties were in turmoil in the late nineteenth century, and in the 1890s, opposition to the Democrats in southern states was most effectively provided by the new People’s, or Populist, Party. Populists represented the belief that ordinary people had lost control of their government to rich corporations, especially the banks and railroads. This new party advocated monetary reform, railroad regulation, control of corporations, and other programs aimed at making government responsible to the citizens.

Populists reached their peak strength in Texas in 1894 and 1896, but failed to unseat the Democrats in statewide elections. The dominant party adopted some Populist programs, and most farmers returned to the Democratic fold. Although not the majority sentiment, Populism is still influential in Texas. Texans who are usually political conservatives can sometimes be roused to vote for candidates who argue that government is making policy at the behest of
wealthy insiders rather than ordinary people. The Populist streak makes Texas politics less predictable than it otherwise might be.

**The Early Twentieth Century**

Seldom has a new century brought such sudden and important changes as the beginning of the twentieth century brought to Texas. On January 10, 1901, an oil well came in at Spindletop, near Beaumont. Oil had been produced in Texas earlier, but not on such a scale. In 1900, the state had supplied 836,000 barrels of oil—about 6 percent of the nation’s production. The Spindletop field exceeded that total in a few weeks and, in its first year, gushed out 3.2 million barrels. At first, Texas competed with Oklahoma and California for oil production leadership; however, with the discovery of the huge (6 billion barrels) East Texas field in 1930, the Lone Star State became not only the nation’s, but also the world’s, leading oil producer.

The abundance and low price of oil in Texas led steamship lines and railroads around the country to abandon the burning of coal and convert to oil. The petroleum business also created secondary industries, such as petrochemicals and the well-service business. Thousands of farm boys left home and took jobs as manual labor “roughnecks.” A few became “wildcatters” (independent explorers), and some of those earned fortunes.

In time, more large fields were discovered in every part of the state, except the far western deserts and the central hill country. Oil, combined later with natural gas, replaced cotton and cattle as the most important industry in the state. Severance (production) taxes became the foundation for state government revenue.

The rise of the oil industry created considerable conflict, as well as prosperity. Through shrewd and ruthless means, the Standard Oil Company had made itself into a monopoly in the northeastern states. Texans were determined to prevent the expansion of this giant corporation into their state. Beginning in 1889, the Texas attorney general began bringing “antitrust” suits against local companies affiliated with Standard Oil. After Spindletop, attorneys general were
even more energetic in trying to repel the expansion of the monopoly. By 1939, the state had brought fourteen antitrust actions against oil companies. People in other states often see Texas as dominated by the oil industry when in reality, as this brief summary illustrates, the state has had an ambivalent relationship with the industry. Texans generally celebrate small, independent firms, especially wildcatters. They are suspicious of the major corporations, and state politicians sometimes reflect that suspicion. This is one expression of the Populist tradition in state politics.

Oil was not the only topic to bring conflict to Texas. Even though the agrarian movement had ended in the late nineteenth century, the spirit of progressivism was not completely dead in the early twentieth century. In 1903, the legislature passed the Terrell Election Law, which provided for a system of primary elections rather than the hodgepodge of practices then in use. The legislature also curtailed child labor by setting minimum ages for working in certain industries. National child labor legislation was not passed until thirteen years later. Antitrust laws were strengthened, and a pioneer pure food and drug law was enacted. Farm credit was eased, and the legislature approved a bank deposit insurance plan—a program not adopted by Washington until the 1930s.

Running counter to this progressive spirit, however, was the requirement that a poll tax be paid as a prerequisite for voting. Authorities differ as to whether African Americans, Mexican Americans, or poor Anglos were the primary target of the law, but African Americans were hit especially hard. Their voter turnout, estimated to be 100,000 in the 1890s, dropped to about 5,000 by 1906. Even this small number, however, was too high for the advocates of White supremacy. In 1904, the legislature permitted, and in 1923 it required, counties to institute the “White primary,” which forbade African Americans and Latinos to participate in the party contest to nominate candidates for the general election. Because in that era Texas was a one-party Democratic state (see Chapter 4), the winner of the Democratic primary was always the winner in the general election. Thus, even if minority citizens managed to cast a ballot in November, they could only choose among candidates who had been designated by an all-White electorate in April.

The environment was another area where progress came slowly. Early efforts to ensure conservation of the state’s natural resources enjoyed little success. Few attempts were made to extract oil from the ground efficiently. A large majority of the oil in most reservoirs was never extracted, and some of the recovered oil was improperly stored so that it ran down the creeks or evaporated. Many improperly drilled wells polluted groundwater. The “flaring” (burning) of natural gas was commonplace into the 1940s. Fifteen million acres of virgin pine trees in East Texas were clear-cut, leading to severe soil erosion. By 1932, only a million acres of forest remained, and wood products had to be imported into the state. Conservation and environmental protection are still uphill battles in Texas.

War and Depression

World War I, which the United States entered in 1917, brought major changes to Texas. The state became an important military training base, and almost 200,000 Texans volunteered for military service. Five thousand lost their lives, many dying from influenza rather than enemy action.
America’s native hatemongering organization, the Ku Klux Klan, flourished in the early 1920s. Originally founded to keep African Americans subjugated, after the war, the Klan expanded its list of despised peoples to include immigrants and Catholics. Between 1922 and 1924, the Klan controlled every elective office in Dallas, in both city and county government. In 1922, the Klan’s candidate, Earle Mayfield, was elected to the U.S. Senate. Hiram Evans of Dallas was elected imperial wizard of the national Klan, and Texas was the center of Klan power nationwide.

When Alfred E. Smith, a New Yorker, a Roman Catholic, and an antip prohibitionist, was nominated for the presidency by the Democrats in 1928, Texas party loyalty frayed for the first time since Reconstruction. Texans voted for the Republican candidate, Herbert Hoover, a Protestant and a prohibitionist. Because of such defections from the formerly Democratic “Solid South” and because of the general national prosperity under a Republican administration, Hoover won.

Partly because the state was still substantially rural and agricultural, the Great Depression that began with the stock market crash of 1929 was less severe in Texas than in more industrialized states. Furthermore, a year later C. M. “Dad” Joiner struck oil near Kilgore, discovering the supergiant East Texas oil field. This bonanza directly and indirectly created jobs for thousands of people. Houston became so prosperous because of the oil boom that it became known as “the city the Depression forgot.”

The liquid wealth pouring from the earth in East Texas, however, also created major problems. So much oil came from that one field so fast that it flooded the market, driving prices down. The price of oil in the middle part of the country dropped from $1.10 per barrel in 1930 to $0.25 a year later, and some lots sold for as little as $0.05 per barrel. With their inexpensive overhead, the small independent producers who dominated the East Texas field could prosper under low prices by simply producing more. However, the major companies, with their enormous investments in pipelines, refineries, and gas stations, faced bankruptcy if the low prices continued. The early 1930s were therefore a period of angry conflict between the large and small producers, with the former arguing for production control, and the latter resisting it.

The Railroad Commission attempted to force the independents to produce less, but the independent producers evaded its orders, and millions of barrels of “hot oil” flowed out of the East Texas field from 1931 to 1935. There was confusion and violence before the state found a solution to the overproduction problem. After much political and legal intrigue, the Railroad Commission devised a formula for “prorating” oil that limited each well to a percentage of its total production capacity. By restricting production, this regulation propped up prices, and the commodity was soon selling for more than $1 per barrel again.

As part of this system of controlling production and prices, in 1935, Texas Senator Tom Connally persuaded Congress to pass a “Hot Oil Act,” which made the interstate sale of oil produced in violation of state law a federal crime. The major companies thus received the state-sanctioned production control upon which their survival depended. Meanwhile, the Railroad Commission was mollifying the independents by creating production regulations that favored small producers.

Thus, for four decades, the Railroad Commission was in effect the director of the Texas economy, setting production limits, and therefore price floors, for the most important industry in the state. Because Texas was such an
important producer, the commission’s regulations exerted a powerful effect on the world price of oil. The commission’s nurturing of the state’s major industry was a major reason the Depression did not hit Texas as hard as it did many other states.

Even though most Texans were able to weather the Depression better than people in some other places, there were still many who were distressed. Unemployment figures for the period are incomplete, but in 1932, Governor Ross Sterling estimated that 300,000 citizens were out of work. Private charities and local governments were unprepared to offer aid on this scale, and in Houston, African Americans and Hispanics were warned not to apply for relief because there was only enough money to take care of Anglos. The state defaulted on interest payments on some of its bonds, and many Texas banks and savings and loans failed. A drought so severe as to create a dust bowl in the Southwest made matters even worse. Texans, with their long tradition of rugged individualism and their belief that “that government is best which governs least,” were shaken and frustrated by these conditions.

Relief came not from state or local action but from the national administration of the new liberal Democratic president, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Texas Democrats played prominent roles in Roosevelt’s New Deal (1933–1945), Vice President John Nance Garner presided over the U.S. Senate for eight years, six Texans chaired key committees in Congress, and Houston banker Jessie Jones, head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, was perhaps Roosevelt’s most important financial adviser and administrator. The New Deal poured more than $1.5 billion into the state in programs ranging from emergency relief to rural electrification to the Civilian Conservation Corps.

As it had during the first global conflict, Texas contributed greatly to the national effort during World War II from 1941 to 1945. The state was once again a major military training site; several bases and many out-of-state trainees remained after the war. More than 750,000 Texans served in the armed forces, and thirty-two received Congressional Medals of Honor. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox claimed that Texas contributed a higher percentage of its male population to military service than did any other state.

**The Silver Lining**

During the Depression, an incident occurred that is of particular interest to students in Texas politics classes. In 1929, the state legislature mandated that all public college students be required to take three course hours studying the American and Texas constitutions. As the Depression wore on, Dr. Caleb Perry Patterson, chairman of the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin, was faced with the prospect of a greatly reduced budget and a consequent loss of teaching positions in the department that would force him to fire several of his colleagues. In 1937 Patterson convinced the legislature to double the American-and-Texas-government requirement to six semester-hours. He thus saved the jobs of his colleagues by imposing a degree requirement that accounts for many of the readers of this book. The History Department was not able to convince the legislature to pass a similar requirement for an American history course until twenty years later, in 1957.
Post–World War II Texas

By 1950 profound changes had occurred in Texas society. The state’s population had shifted from largely rural to 60 percent urban in the decade of the 1940s; the number of manufacturing workers had doubled; and Texas had continued to attract outside capital and new industry. Aluminum production, defense contracting, and high-technology activities were among the leading industries. In 1959, Jack Kilby, an engineer employed by Texas Instruments, developed and patented the microchip, a tiny piece of technology that was to transform the state, the nation, and the world.

After World War II, state politics in Texas was increasingly controlled by conservative Democrats. As a former member of the Confederacy, Texas was one of twenty-two states that had laws requiring racial segregation. The 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision (Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483) declaring segregated public schools unconstitutional caused an uproar in Texas. State leaders opposed integration, just as their predecessors had opposed Reconstruction ninety years earlier. Grade-a-year integration of the schools—a simple and effective solution—was rejected. Millions of dollars in school funds were spent in legal battles to delay the inevitable.

Texas politics also continued to be colorful. In 1948, Congressman Lyndon B. Johnson opposed former Governor Coke Stevens for a vacant U.S. Senate seat. The vote count was very close in the primary runoff which, with Texas still being dominated by the Democratic Party, was the only election that mattered. As one candidate would seem to pull ahead, another uncounted ballot box that gave the edge to his opponent would be conveniently discovered in South or East Texas. The suspense continued for three days, until Johnson finally won by a margin of eighty-seven votes.

Historical research has left no doubt that the box that put Johnson over the top was the product of fraud on the part of the political machine that ruled Duval County. Among students of American politics, this is probably the most famous dirty election in the history of the country. The circumstances surrounding the election have attracted so much attention because “Landslide Lyndon” Johnson went on to become majority leader of the U.S. Senate, vice president, and then, in 1963, the first Texas politician to attain the office of president of the United States.

Also in the postwar period, Texas experienced an influx of immigrants. Immigration in the nineteenth century had been primarily from adjacent states, Mexico, and west, central, and southern Europe. Following World War II, immigrants began coming not only from all fifty states, but also from Latin America and a variety of other areas, including those of the Middle East and Asia. This trend continues today.

Gradual Political Change

Since the 1950s, Texas has become increasingly diverse in its politics as well as its population. Politicians such as U.S. Senator Ralph Yarborough (1957–1971), Commissioner of Agriculture Jim Hightower (1987–1991), and Governor Ann Richards (1991–1995) have demonstrated that liberals can win statewide offices. Republicans also have won, beginning with U.S. Senator John Tower (1961–1984) and continuing with Governor Bill Clements (1979–1983 and 1987–1991). Furthermore, candidates from formerly excluded groups have
enjoyed increasing success, especially after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Morris Overstreet was the first African American elected to statewide office, gaining a seat on the Court of Criminal Appeals in 1990. That same year, Mexican Americans Dan Morales and Raul Gonzalez were elected attorney general and justice of the Supreme Court, respectively. Kay Bailey Hutchison broke the gender barrier in statewide elections to national office by being elected U.S. Senator in 1993.

Late-Twentieth-Century Texas

Texas entered a period of good times in the early 1970s. As worldwide consumption of petroleum increased dramatically, the demand for Texas oil outstripped the supply. The Railroad Commission removed market-demand production restrictions in 1972, permitting every well to produce any amount that would not damage ultimate recovery. The following year, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) more than doubled world oil prices
and boycotted the American market. Severe energy shortages developed, and the price of oil peaked at more than $40 per barrel. Consumers, especially those from the energy-poor Northeast, grumbled about long lines at gas stations and high prices, but the petroleum industry prospered and the state of Texas enjoyed billion-dollar treasury surpluses.

The 1980s, however, were as miserable for Texas as the previous decade had been agreeable. High oil prices stimulated a worldwide search for the black liquid, and by 1981, so many supplies had been found that the price began to fall. The slide was gradual at first, but the glut of oil was so great that in 1985, the price crashed from its peak of over $40 per barrel in the 1970s to under $10. As petroleum prices plunged, so did the economy in Texas: For every $1 drop in world oil prices, 13,500 Texans became unemployed, the state government lost $100 million in revenue from severance taxes, and the gross state product contracted by $2.3 billion. Northern consumers smiled as they filled the gas tanks of their cars, but the oil industry and the state of Texas went into shock.

Economic poverty was only one of the miseries that visited Texas in the 1980s. The state’s crime rate shot up 29 percent. Most of the crimes committed were related to property and were probably a consequence of the demand for illegal drugs, which constantly increased despite intense public relations and interdiction efforts at the national level. Texans insisted upon better law enforcement and longer sentences for convicted criminals just as the state’s tax base was contracting.

The combination of shrinking revenues and growing demand for services forced Texas politicians to do the very thing they hated most: increase taxes. In 1984, the legislature raised Texas taxes by $4.8 billion. Then, faced with greatly reduced state income, it was forced to act again. First came an increase of almost $1 billion in 1986; and then in 1987, there was a boost of $5.7 billion, the largest state tax increase in the history of the United States up to that time.

This system of raising revenue by raising taxes, and relying even more heavily on the sales tax, became more regressive than ever. To make matters worse, the increases came just as Congress eliminated sales taxes as a deductible item on the federal income tax. By the end of the 1980s, Texans were battered, frazzled, and gloomy.

However, the situation reversed itself again in the 1990s. As the petroleum industry declined, entrepreneurs created other types of businesses to take its place. Computer equipment, aerospace technology, industrial machinery, and scientific instruments became important parts of the economy. The state began to export more goods. Despite the fact that Texas oil production reached a fifty-year low in 1993, by the mid-1990s the economy was booming, even outperforming the nation as a whole. The boom continued to the end of the century, at which point the state had the eleventh largest economy in the world. The entry into a new economic era was underscored by the fact that by 1997, more Texans were employed in high-tech industries than by the oil industry.

Prosperity brought another surge in immigration, and in 1994, the Lone Star State passed New York as the second most populous in the country, with 18.4 million residents. Even the crime rate was down. The election of the state’s governor, George W. Bush, to the presidency of the United States in 2000 seemed to guarantee a rosy future for Texas.
Modern Times

The new century brought many surprises for Texans, as it did for other Americans, many of which were unpleasant. The national economy began to stagger during the spring of 2001. Soon, the media were full of revelations of gigantic fraud in the accounting practices of many apparently successful corporations, including Enron, an energy-trading company based in Houston. The news sent the stock market into a tailspin, and the high-tech sector so important in Texas was hit particularly hard. As high tech went into a recession, Texas lost thousands of jobs.9

Economic troubles were joined by political disaster when, on September 11, radical Muslim terrorists hijacked four jet planes and flew two into, and destroyed, the World Trade Center in New York, as well as flying another into the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C., and crashing another into farmland in Pennsylvania. The national grief and outrage over the 3,000 murders resulting from these attacks were accompanied by many economic problems as the United States struggled to spend money to prevent such attacks in the future.

Although not a direct target of the attacks, Texans were as much involved in their consequences as the residents of other states. Efforts to guard borders and

The History of Prehistory

Legislators love to proclaim official state symbols—it doesn’t cost anything, and it’s fun. Thus, Texas has an official bird (mockingbird), an official mammal (armadillo), an official fish (guadalupe bass), and many other nonhuman representatives. Sometimes, however, the definition of a state symbol depends on science, and when science changes, the symbol has to be adjusted.

In 1997, the legislature named a large plant-eating lizard, *Pleurocoelus altus*—extinct for the last 112 million years—as the state dinosaur. Although fossils of that species of dinosaur were much more common on the east coast of the United States than in Texas, it was apparently impressive enough to be nominated as the state symbol. Because the reptile is never coming back to life, that action would seem to have been the end of the story.

However, in 2007, Peter Rose, a graduate student in paleontology at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, began to examine a fossil of the alleged Texas *Pleurocoelus*. He decided that the fossil skeleton in front of him was so different from the ones that had been found in Maryland that it was really a different species. *Pleurocoelus*, he concluded, had never roamed as far west as Texas. He wrote a professional paper reporting his conclusions and suggesting that the new species receive the scientific name *Paluxysaurus jonesi*, after the Paluxy River and Jones Ranch in northern Texas, where the fossil had been found. His suggestions were accepted by the official organization of paleontology. Therefore, *Pleurocoelus*, the dinosaur symbol of Texas, was exposed as never having lived in the state.

Politicians, of course, could not allow Texas to be symbolized by the wrong extinct creature. In 2009, the state legislature removed *Pleurocoelus* as the state dinosaur and substituted *Paluxysaurus*.

The protection of buildings were hugely expensive, and conflicting ideas about the ways to interdict terrorists while protecting the civil liberties of loyal citizens were as intense in Texas as elsewhere. The new era in American history guaranteed a new era in Texas politics.

The 2000s were also fraught with perils created by nature rather than by human action. In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina flooded New Orleans in Louisiana, sending hundreds of thousands of refugees across the state border to Houston. The Texas state government paid for housing many of the storm refugees in the Astrodome. Just two weeks later, Hurricane Rita roared ashore on the Texas-Louisiana border, causing major flooding in East Texas and draining the state government of more funds. Then, in 2008, Hurricane Ike devastated Galveston with a 16-foot storm surge and 110 mile-per-hour winds, and caused destruction and loss of life in Houston and the Beaumont-Port Arthur area. Two years later, the state’s insurance bill for Ike’s damage had approached $12 billion, on top of more than three dozen deaths.10

The consequences for the state of these natural disasters did not just consist of mourning and disruption; even before Ike, many insurance companies had stopped writing policies for homes along the Gulf Coast.11 In the aftermath of the destruction, the citizens of Texas began to reexamine their opposition to government regulation in the midst of a debate about the wisdom of legal restraints on building in areas of coastline that are vulnerable to major storms.12

Moreover, as the nation tried to deal with a threatened economic catastrophe caused by the popping of a real-estate bubble, the consequent crash of the stock market, and a severe recession beginning in 2008, Texans found the values of their homes and their stock portfolios declining with everyone else’s. As the private economy contracted, state revenue plunged. In Chapter 12 we will report on the problems caused for the state budget by the “Great Recession.”

Meanwhile, Texas continued to face some old problems. About 17 percent of its population lived in poverty in 2009—the sixth highest among the states.13 Although the overall crime rate had declined, the tide of drugs coming into society showed no signs of abating. Additionally, as will be discussed in this book, Texas still had major social and political conflicts. One of the questions that will be considered in the course of our discussion is whether the traditional political attitudes of Texas will be adequate to deal with the challenges of the new era.

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**Texas as a Democracy**

In this book, one of the major themes revolves around the concept of democracy and the extent to which Texas approaches the ideal of a democratic state. A democracy is a system of government resting on the theory that political legitimacy is created by the citizens’ participation. Legitimacy is the belief people have that their government is founded upon morally right principles and that they should therefore obey its laws. According to the moral theory underlying a democratic system of government, because the people themselves (indirectly, through representatives) make the laws, they are morally obligated to obey them.
Complications of this theory abound, and a number of them are explored in each chapter in this book. Because some means to allow people to participate in the government must exist, free elections, in which candidates or parties compete for the citizens’ votes, are necessary. There must be some connection between what a majority of the people want and what the government actually does; how close the connection must be is a matter of some debate. Despite the importance of “majority rule” in a democracy, majorities must not be allowed to take away certain rights from minorities, such as the right to vote, the right to be treated equally under the law, and the right to freedom of expression.

In a well-run democracy, politicians debate questions of public policy honestly, the media report the debate in a fair manner, and the people pay attention to the debate, and then vote their preferences consistently with their understanding of the public interest. Government decisions are made on the basis of law, without anyone having an unearned advantage. In a badly run or corrupt democracy, politicians are dominated by special interests but seek to hide the fact by clouding public debate with irrelevancies and showmanship; the media do not point out the problem because they themselves are either corrupt or lazy; and the people fail to hold either the politicians or the media accountable because they do not participate or because they participate carelessly and selfishly. Government decisions are made on the basis of special influence and inside dealing.

In other words, a good democracy is one in which government policy is arrived at through public participation, debate, and compromise. A bad democracy is one in which mass apathy and private influence are the determining factors.

All political systems that are based on the democratic theory of legitimacy have elements of both good and bad. No human institution—no family, church, or government—is perfect, but it is always useful to compare a real institution to an ideal of it and judge how closely the reality conforms to the ideal. Improvements come through the process of attempting to move the reality ever closer to the ideal.

Although many of them could not state it clearly, the great majority of Americans, and Texans, believe in some version of the theory of democracy. It is therefore possible to judge our state government (as it is also possible to judge our national government) according to the extent to which it approximates the ideal of a democratic society and to indicate the direction that the political system must move to become more democratic. Chapters in this book will frequently compare the reality of state government to the ideal of the democratic polity, and ask readers to judge whether they think there is room for improvement in Texas democracy.

As indicated, one of the major causes of shortcomings in democratic government, in Texas as elsewhere, is private influence over public policy. Ideally, government decisions are made to try to maximize the public interest, but too often in reality, they are fashioned at the behest of individuals who are pursuing their own special interests at the expense of the public interests. This book will explore the ways that powerful individuals try to distort the people’s institutions into vehicles of their own advantage. It also will examine ways that representatives of the public resist these selfish efforts to influence public policy. Part of the political process in Texas, as in other democracies, is the struggle to ensure that the making of public policy is truly a people’s activity rather than a giveaway to the few who are rich, powerful, and well connected.
Texas and American Federalism

This book is about the politics of one state. However, just as it would be impossible to describe the functions of one organ in the human body without reference to the body as a whole, it would be misleading to analyze one state without reference to the nation.

The United States has a federal system. This label means that its powers are divided between, and shared among, the national government and the state governments. Because the national and state governments must share responsibility for many policy areas, a great many state responsibilities are strongly influenced by the actions of all three branches of the national government. Further, the states and the federal government frequently disagree, and often their disagreements become connected to larger political conflict.

For example, in 1994 the state’s environmental protection agency, then called the Texas Resource Conservation Commission (TRCC), created a set of rules to apply to power plants and refineries. The rules permitted each plant to vary the amount of air pollution created by individual sources within the plant (such as a boiler), as long as the total amount emitted by the plant as a whole stayed below a specified level. Those rules stayed in place for a decade. But in 2005 the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a statement that it believed that the state rules allowed Texas plants to put too much pollution into the air, thus violating the federal Clean Air Act of 1990. As one environmentalist explained the federal position, the flexible permitting program “is like saying, ‘As long as you go 55 miles per hour on average, in a month, you can go 100 or 125 some days.’” The EPA indicated that Texas had better start setting limits for each individual source of pollution within every plant, or it would take over the state’s program.

Texas Republican politicians viewed this threat as an occasion to expound on one of their favorite themes—that Washington is inept yet power-hungry, and knows less about how to govern Texas than Texans do. As the dispute became
more heated in 2010, Governor Perry wrote a letter to the EPA that it was about to replace a successful state program “with a less effective Washington-based, bureaucratic-led, command and control mandate,” while Lieutenant Governor Dewhurst characterized the EPA’s action as “politically driven by the increasingly partisan Obama administration in trying to mess with Texas.”

In June of 2010, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott filed a “petition of reconsideration” with the federal courts, asking the judges to put the EPA’s action on hold in order to “defend the state’s legal rights and challenge improper overreach by the federal government.” Meanwhile, several Democratic state legislators accused the Republican politicians of turning a public health issue into a partisan debate, and called on the EPA to do everything in its power to ensure that Texans breathe clean air.

As a general theme, the state-versus-federal government argument arose before there was a state of Texas, during the 1790s, and will no doubt continue in some form long after this particular tiff between the EPA and Texas politicians is forgotten. For the present, the value of the controversy is that it illustrates the type of not-always-easy relationship that Texas experiences with the larger national government.

Environmental protection is only one of the state’s policy spheres in which the federal government is a constant and important—though sometimes irritating—influence. Washington makes an impact on Texas government in other areas as well, including the following:

1. A significant portion of state revenue each year comes from federal grants (see Chapter 12).
2. The U.S. Supreme Court oversees the actions of the state government and, historically, has forced Texas to make many changes in its behavior, especially with regard to civil rights and liberties (see Chapter 11).
3. Congress allocates many of the “goodies” of government, such as military bases, veterans’ hospitals, highways, and so on, which have a crucial impact on the state’s economy.
4. Congress mandates the state government to take actions, such as making public buildings accessible to people with disabilities or instituting background checks on gun purchasers, that force the Texas legislature to raise and spend money.
5. Congressional policymaking and budget decisions shape sensitive state issues, such as the response to poverty (Medicaid policy, for example) and protection of the environment (requirements for clean water and air, for example).
6. When Congress declares war or the president sends troops to a foreign conflict without a declaration of war, Texans fight and die. The war on terrorism that began with the 9/11 attacks has imposed particular burdens on Texas. In its efforts to seal national borders from infiltration, the federal government has slowed the traffic between the United States and Mexico, which has inevitably damaged commerce between Texas and Mexico. Efforts to protect buildings, dams, bridges, and water supplies from future attacks have required expenditures of large sums of money by state and...
local authorities. Campaigns to train “first responders” such as police, fire, and medical personnel to react quickly and competently to potential terrorist incidents have put further strain on local and state budgets. Policies by the federal Department of Justice to identify terrorists by gaining access to information about all residents of the United States have raised fears, in Texas as elsewhere, that ordinary citizens will lose many of their civil liberties.

7. The president’s many discretionary powers, such as cutting tariffs on imported goods and releasing federal disaster-relief funds, leave their mark, for good or ill, on the state’s economy.

8. When the Federal Reserve Board raises or lowers interest rates, it constrains or stimulates Texas’s economy, along with the economies of the other forty-nine states. The changes thus created powerfully affect both the amount of money the state legislature has to spend and the demands on its allocation of resources.

Although this brief list may seem to describe a relationship between the states and the national government that is static, in fact the relationship is constantly changing and thus, as the EPA example illustrates, is often the subject of conflict. Given the nature of federalism, how Texas fits into it at any time is the result of an ongoing argument. Texas politics is a subject unto itself, but it is also part of a larger whole; therefore, this book, which focuses on Texas, contains frequent references to actions by national institutions and politicians.

Texas in the International Arena

Despite the fact that the U.S. Constitution forbids the individual states to conduct independent foreign policies, the shared border between Texas and Mexico has long exercised an important effect on the politics of Texas. Not only are many Texas citizens of Mexican (and other Latin) background, but the common border of Texas and Mexico, the Rio Grande, flows for more than 800 miles through an arid countryside, a situation that almost demands cooperation over the use of water. Furthermore, with the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993, Texas became important as an avenue of increased commerce between Mexico and the United States. Interstate Highway 35, which runs from the Mexican border at Laredo through San Antonio, Austin, and the Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex, and then north to Duluth, Minnesota, has become so important as a passageway of international trade that it is sometimes dubbed “the NAFTA highway.” As a result of geographic proximity, Mexico is an important factor in Texas economy and politics, and vice versa.

Many examples could be used to illustrate the interconnections of Texan and Mexican politics, but the following example is one drawn from the criminal justice system. At first glance, it might seem like this case was wholly a matter of internal interest to Texas. On the contrary, however, this case demonstrates that even a subject such as the state’s decision to execute a murderer can have an international impact.15
As the world has become more integrated, and especially as economies have become globalized, Texas leaders have attempted to establish institutions for dealing with foreign governments. Their efforts in this area have been particularly enthusiastic in regard to Mexico. The state opened a trade office in Mexico City in 1971, helped establish the Border Governors’ Conference in 1980, began the Texas-Mexico Agricultural Exchange in 1984, has participated in the Border States Attorneys General Conference since 1986, and established the Office of International Coordination to deal with the problem of retrieving child support payments from fugitive fathers in 1993. Texas governors now have special advisors on the economy and politics of foreign countries, and they make trips to visit foreign politicians in hopes of increasing commerce between their state and foreign countries.

In its attempts to establish regular relationships with foreign countries, Texas comes close to having a state “foreign policy.” However, is it wise for a state, as opposed to the U.S. national government, to be so deeply involved in foreign affairs?

**PRO**

▲ The Constitution does not forbid states to enter into voluntary, informal arrangements with foreign governments, and the Tenth Amendment declares that anything not forbidden to the states is permitted.

▲ Most state foreign policy initiatives, such as the Texas trade agreements with Mexico, deal with friendly relations, not disputes.

▲ Since when is competition a bad thing? If citizens want to keep labor unions strong and the environment clean, they should vote for candidates who will support such policies.

▲ As the example of Javier Suarez Medina illustrates, domestic actions in Texas already have had an impact on relations with foreign countries. It would be better to acknowledge this fact frankly and make state policy with the conscious intent of furthering the state’s interests.

**CON**

▼ A major reason for the independent states coming together to form the union in 1787 was so that they could stop working at cross-purposes in foreign policy and present a united front to the world, and that is why Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution says that “No state shall . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power. . . .”

▼ The Logan Act of 1799 prohibits U.S. citizens from “holding correspondence with a foreign government or its agents, with intent to influence the measures of such government in relations to disputes or controversies with the United States.”

▼ If states (and cities) are allowed to compete for business with foreign countries, their rivalry will cause them to lower standards of labor and environmental protection.

▼ If all fifty states have independent relations with foreign countries, it will cause confusion and chaos between the federal government and those countries.

In 1988, Javier Suarez Medina shot to death a Dallas police officer while the officer was conducting an undercover drug sting. There was no doubt about Medina’s guilt, as he was immediately apprehended by other police officers—the perfect open-and-shut, smoking-gun-in-the-hand arrest. However, things were not as simple as they first appeared.

Medina, as became clear later, had been born in Mexico. Because of his foreign nationality, under the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations of 1963, ratified by the United States and 169 other countries in 1969, local authorities were supposed to notify the Mexican consul and allow that country to assist Medina with his defense. While Medina was being held after his arrest, however, he gave conflicting and confusing statements as to his nationality, claiming at various times that he came to El Paso when he was three or seven years old and that he was born in that city. Partly because of their confusion as to his nativity, and partly, no doubt, because of their intense desire to punish a cop killer, neither the Dallas police department nor the state ever contacted the Mexican consulate. Medina was tried, convicted of murder, and sentenced to die by lethal injection.

While Medina sat on death row, however, his case came to the attention of Mexican officials. They launched a campaign to persuade the state to retry him, this time complying with the requirements of the consular treaty. Part of the conflict was caused by the fact that except under unusual circumstances, such as crimes under military law or during wartime, Mexico does not execute criminals. The case became a patriotic cause in Mexico, with that country’s politicians feeling bound to try to make Texas officials reverse the conviction or at least commute Medina’s sentence to life in prison.

In 2002, Mexican President Vicente Fox made a personal crusade of the Medina case. He appealed to the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, Governor Rick Perry, and President George W. Bush to stop or postpone the execution. Nevertheless, all national and state individuals and institutions politely ignored Fox. Medina was executed on August 14, 2002.

Fox was scheduled to visit Texas, and President Bush at his ranch in Crawford, in late August of that year. However, the Mexican president’s inability to affect the Medina case was, from his point of view and the point of view of his country, an insult that could not be ignored. Fox canceled the visit. His office issued a statement that “it would be inappropriate to carry out this trip to Texas given these lamentable circumstances.” Relations between the two countries, on the upswing after decades of hostility, immediately turned around and became tense.

In January 2003, the Mexican government filed a complaint before the International Court of Justice (ICJ, known informally as the World Court) in The Hague, Netherlands, alleging that fifty-four Mexican nationals, several of them in Texas, were currently on death row even though the Mexican consulate had not been notified of their arrests and trials. The next month, the ICJ issued a decision telling Texas and Oklahoma to postpone three executions until it had time to investigate the cases. The ICJ has no authority in the United States, and both states ignored its “order.” The Mexican government obviously hoped to use the publicity the World Court’s decision generated to bring moral persuasion to bear on American state governments. So far, it has had no success in this area, but the fact that it is trying is an indication of how seriously Mexicans take the issue.

Fox and Perry eventually decided that the interests of their two polities were too important to ignore, and they agreed to disagree. In November 2003, Fox returned to Texas as the governor’s guest.
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court held in two other cases, one from Oregon and one from Virginia, that foreign-born convicted criminals do not have the right to be retried because their states failed to notify their native countries of their arrest. The Justices did not squarely address the issue of whether individuals are entitled to rights under the Vienna Convention, or whether that treaty refers only to diplomacy between nations. No matter how the Court ruled, of course, it was too late to save Medina, or to undo the damage to relations between Mexico and Texas/United States. Despite the legal ambiguity and the eventual reconciliation of the two Mexican and Texan leaders, the point had been made that the actions of Texas’s criminal justice system can have repercussions on relations between the United States, as a whole, and a foreign country. The political choices of states, such as Texas, have consequences far beyond their own governments.

The Texas Political Culture

Like the other forty-nine states, Texas is part of a well-integrated American civil society. It is also a separate and distinctive society with its own history and present-day political system. Culture is the product of the historical experiences of a people in a particular area. Our political system is the product of our political culture. Political culture refers to a shared system of values, beliefs, and habits of behavior with regard to government and politics.

Not everyone in a given political culture accepts all of that culture’s assumptions, but everyone is affected by the beliefs and values of the dominant groups in society. Often, the culture of the majority group is imposed on members of a minority who would prefer not to live with it.

Texas’s political culture is unusual, partly because of the state’s great size, its geographic isolation until the twentieth century, and the historical fact that it was an independent republic before joining the United States. The state’s culture is also distinctive because it is a mixture of the cultures of the Old South and the Western frontier.

Texas shares with other Southern states its history as a society that formerly held slaves, and one that was defeated in a civil war and then occupied, in a humiliating fashion, by victorious Northern troops. In common with other White Southerners after the end of Reconstruction, Anglo Texans attempted to deny full citizenship to African Americans. Because of the Lone Star State’s proximity to Mexico, the Anglos further tried to suppress the citizenship of Latinos. The historical heritage of White people in Texas is thus one of extreme cultural conservatism. This conservatism has extended not only to attitudes on civil rights for minority citizens, but also to hostility toward labor unions and toward liberal political programs in general.

Mixing with and reinforcing the Old South cultural conservatism has been an intense individualism deriving from the myth of the frontier. Anglo Texans have always seen themselves as ruggedly independent, as self-sufficient pioneers who need no help from anyone and are not obligated to support other people with their taxes. This hostility toward collective action, especially on behalf of the weak, has dovetailed perfectly with southern cultural conservatism to strengthen public opposition to liberal, activist government in Texas.
Political scientist Daniel Elazar and his associates have extensively investigated patterns of political culture across the fifty states. Elazar identifies three broad, historically developed patterns of political culture. Although every state contains some elements of each of the three cultures, politics within states in identifiable regions tend to be dominated by one or a combination of two of the cultures.

In the *moralistic* political culture, citizens understand the state and the nation as commonwealths designed to further the shared interests of everyone. Citizen participation is widely shared value, and governmental activism on behalf of the common good is encouraged. This culture tends to be dominant across the extreme northern tier of American states. The states of Washington and Minnesota approach the “ideal type” of the moralistic culture.

In the *individualistic* political culture, citizens understand the state and nation as marketplaces in which people strive to better their personal welfare. Citizen participation is encouraged as a means of individual achievement, and government activity is encouraged when it attempts to create private opportunity and discouraged when it attempts to redistribute wealth. This culture tends to be dominant across the “middle north” of the country from New Jersey westward. Nevada and Illinois approach the ideal types of the individualistic culture.

In the *traditionalistic* political culture, citizens technically believe in democracy, but emphasize deference to elite rule within a hierarchical society. While formally important, citizen participation is not encouraged and the participation of disfavored ethnic or religious groups may be discouraged. Government activity is generally viewed with suspicion unless its purpose is to reinforce the power of the dominant groups. This culture tends to be dominant in the southern tier of states from the east coast of the continent to New Mexico. The states with ideal types of traditionalistic cultures are Mississippi and Arkansas.

Table 1-1 summarizes the three political cultures as they are expressed across a number of significant political and social dimensions. It is important to understand that the general tendencies displayed in the table permit many exceptions. They represent only broad patterns of human action, that is, the way many people in the groups have often behaved throughout history. They do not describe everyone, nor do they prescribe a manner in which anyone must behave in the future.

The research that has been done on Texas places it at a midpoint between the traditionalistic and individualistic political cultures. Historically, the state’s experience as a slave-holding member of the Confederacy tends to embed it firmly in traditionalism, but its strong business orientation, growing more important every decade, infuses its original culture with an increasingly influential individualistic orientation. Many of the political patterns discussed in this book are easier to understand within the context of the Texas blend of cultures.

Not all Texans have shared the beliefs and attitudes that will be described here. In particular, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, African Americans and Mexican Americans have tended to be somewhat separate from the political culture of the dominant Anglo majority. Nevertheless, both history and present political institutions have imposed clear patterns on the assumptions that most Texans bring to politics.

There is one sense in which Texas has a well-earned reputation for uniqueness. All visitors have testified to the intense state patriotism of Texans. Whatever their education, income, age, race, religion, gender, or political ideology, most Texans seem to love their state passionately. Whether this state patriotism is due to the myth of the Old West as peddled by novels, schools, and Hollywood,
or to the state’s size and geographic isolation, or to its unusual history, or to something in the water, is impossible to say. This patriotism, however, has little political relevance because native Texans show no hostility toward non-natives and have elected several non-native governors. But woe to the politician who does not publicly embrace the myth that Texas is the most wonderful place to live that has ever existed on the planet! As scholars rather than politicians, the authors of this book intend to look at the state through a more analytic lens.

Part of the larger American political tradition is a basic attitude toward government and politicians that was most famously expressed in a single sentence attributed to President Thomas Jefferson: “That government is best which governs least.” As the quote from Edward Abbey at the beginning of this chapter attests, Jefferson’s philosophy has a powerful presence in the United States in contemporary times. The name usually given to that philosophy is conservatism, and it has dominated Texas politics since the end of the Civil War.

The term conservatism is complex, and its implications change with time and situation. In general, however, it refers to a general hostility toward government activity, especially in the economic sphere. Most of the early White settlers came to Texas to seek their fortunes. They cared little about government and
wanted no interference in their economic affairs. Their attitudes were consistent with the popular values of the Jeffersonian Democrats of the nineteenth century: the less government the better, local control of what little government there was, and freedom from economic regulation, or “laissez faire” (a French phrase loosely translated as “leave it alone”).

Conservatism is, in general, consistent with the individualistic political culture on economic issues (welfare, for example) and with the traditionalistic political culture on social issues (civil rights, for example). Texas conservatism minimizes the role of government in society, and particularly in the economy. It stresses an individualism that maximizes the role of businesspeople in controlling the economy. To a Texas conservative, a good government is mainly one that keeps taxes low.

Consistent with the emphasis on laissez faire is a type of social Darwinism: the belief that individuals who prosper and rise to the top of the socioeconomic ladder are worthy and deserve their riches, while those who sink to the bottom (or having been born there, stay there) are unworthy and deserve their poverty. Social Darwinists argue that people become rich because they are intelligent, energetic, and self-disciplined, whereas those who become or remain poor do so because they are stupid, lazy, and/or given to indulgence in personal vices. Socioeconomic status, they argue, is the result of natural selection.

It is true that a person’s success in life frequently results in part from his or her behavior and qualities of character. Success, however, also depends on many other factors, such as education, race and ethnicity, proper diet and medical care, the wealth and education of the person’s parents, and luck. Nonetheless, social Darwinism continues to dominate the thinking of many Texans who strongly resist the idea that government has an obligation to come to the aid of the less fortunate in society.

Rhetoric and Reality

In practice, laissez faire in Texas has often been pseudo (false) laissez faire. Entrepreneurs do not want government to regulate or tax them, and they denounce policies to help society’s less fortunate as “socialism.” However, when they encounter a business problem that is too big to handle, they do not hesitate to accept government help.

A good example is the city of Houston. Its leaders praise their city as the home of unrestrained, unaided free enterprise. In fact, however, Houston has historically relied on government activity for its economic existence. The ship channel, which connects the city’s port to the sea, was dredged and is maintained by the federal government. Much of the oil industry, which was responsible for Houston’s twentieth-century boom, was sustained either by state regulation through the Railroad Commission or by the federal government selling facilities to the industry cheaply, as occurred with the Big Inch and Little Inch pipelines. Billions of dollars of federal tax money have flowed into the area to create jobs in the space industry (the Johnson Space Center and NASA).

Houston’s business leaders have not resisted such government action on their behalf—quite the contrary. It is only when government tries to help ordinary people that the business community upholds the banner of laissez faire.

This resistance to government aid to the needy has resulted in many state policies that mark Texas as a state with an unusually stingy attitude toward the underprivileged. For example, at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, among the fifty states, Texas ranked forty-fourth in its weekly payments to the mothers of poor children (TANF) and forty-seventh in its spending on public welfare programs.¹⁹

Pseudo laissez faire economic doctrine and social Darwinism lead to a trickle-down theory of economic and social development. If business flourishes, so the theory goes, prosperity will follow and benefits will trickle down to the majority of Texans. In other words, if government caters to the needs of business rather than attempting to improve the lives of the poor, everyone’s economic situation will improve. To a degree, the trickle-down theory does work, but only to a degree, because approximately 17 percent of the state’s citizens existed at or below the poverty level in 2009.²⁰

Another general attitude toward government, called liberalism, accepts or even endorses government activity as often being a good thing. Although conservatives have dominated Texas politics through most of its history, occasionally liberals have been elected to public office, and sometimes liberal ideas have been adopted as state policy. The conflict between liberalism and conservatism underlies much political argument in the United States. Chapter 4 explores the way these two ideologies have formed the basis for much of Texas politics.

### Economy, Taxes, and Services

When General Sheridan made his harsh evaluation of Texas in 1855 (see quotation at beginning of chapter), the state was poor, rural, and agricultural. As summarized earlier in this chapter, however, in the twentieth century, its economy was transformed: first by the boom in the oil industry that began at Spindletop in 1901, and then by diversification into petrochemicals, aerospace, computers, and many other industries. Metropolitan areas boomed along with the economy, and the state became the second most populous in the nation.

The state’s political culture, however, has not changed as rapidly as its population and economy. Texas’s basic conservatism is evident in the way the state government treats business and industry. In 2007, for example, Texas was rated by cable channel CNBC as number one on its ranking of “America’s Top States for Business,” passing number two Virginia for the first time.²¹ Similarly, in 2009 the Small Business and Entrepreneurship Council ranked Texas as having the third best environment for small business.²²

Other observers are less admiring of the Texas economy and less optimistic about its future. A favorable business climate consisting of low taxes, weak labor unions, and an inactive government may seem attractive in the short run; however, in the long run, these policies may create a fragile economy. The Corporation for Enterprise Development (CED) is a private organization that sometimes grades each state in terms not only of its economic health at any one time, but also its capacity for positive growth in the future. In 2002 and again in 2007, the CED flunked the Texas economy as a whole, giving it Ds in “earnings and job quality,” Fs in “equity,” Fs in “quality of life,” and Ds in “resource efficiency.” The CED commented in 2002 that “a theme of inequality throughout the state . . . the disparity between the wealthy and the poor . . .” augured poorly.
for the future of Texas. In contrast to Texas, the CED reported that its “honor roll” states of Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Virginia, and Wisconsin were pursuing public policies that ensured them a brighter economic outlook.23

Because of the Jeffersonian conservative philosophy underlying many of the activities of Texas government, the state generally does little, compared to the governments of other states, to improve the lives of its citizens. As Table 1-2 illustrates, on several measures of state services, Texas ranks near the bottom. The state spends comparatively little on education, health, welfare, the environment, and the arts. Furthermore, it raises the relatively small amount of revenue it does spend in a “regressive” manner, that is, in a manner that falls unusually lightly on the rich and unusually heavily on the poor. The philosophy that dominates Texas politics holds that if government will just keep taxes low—especially on its wealthier citizens—and stay out of the way, society will take care of itself.

Part of the discussion in this book will center on the way Texas politics reflects “a theme of inequality.” Some chapters will analyze the sources of unequal politics; some will portray the consequences of it in terms of public policy. Always, the implications of inequality for democratic legitimacy will be a major focus in this discussion.

Liberals, viewing the facts on display in Table 1-2, would argue that Texas’s laissez faire ideology has had a pernicious effect on its quality of life. Texans, as a group, are so patriotic that it is difficult for them to believe that their state is a comparatively undesirable place to live, but liberals would point to the sorts of evidence illustrated in Table 1-3. As the table emphasizes, the state ranks

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### TABLE 1-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Per-capita personal income</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. State government per-capita spending</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Spending per school pupil</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Average teacher salary</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Per-capita Medicaid spending</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Average monthly benefit, Women, Infants and Children (WIC)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Average monthly payment, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. State spending on arts agency</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Per-capita spending on water quality</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Regressivity of state and local taxes</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1-3
Texas Rank among States in Measures of Quality of Life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality-of-Life Measure</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Highest violent crime rate</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Highest overall crime rate</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Highest incarceration rate</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Highest poverty rate</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Best &quot;condition of children&quot; index</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Cleanest drinking water</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Highest air pollution emissions</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Best average SAT reading score</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Best average SAT math scores</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Best health care system</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Highest percentage of overweight or obese adults (66.2%)</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Best “chance for success” for children</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Most liveable based on “state livability” index</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Don’t Worry, Be Happy

The measures of quality of life reported in Table 1-3 are objective. That is, they summarize how Texas ranks in the sorts of living situations that can be measured from the outside. On those measures, Texas looks like a comparatively poor place to live. But what about the subjective—the way people feel about themselves on the inside?

In 2009, researchers led by Professor Andrew Oswald of the University of Warwick published their conclusions after examining a 2005 survey of 1.3 million Americans’ answers to questions about their satisfaction with their lives. On the basis of that subjective measurement, Texas was one of the happiest states, ranking number fifteen. Louisiana scored as the happiest state, while New York was the least happy.

So, is Texas a good place to live? The answer depends on what measurements are used as evidence.

relatively low on measures of air cleanliness, the general health of its population, freedom from crime, the educational status of its citizens, and other measures of civilized living. Liberals would argue that the policies evident in the first table have caused the problems evident in the second table.

Conservatives might argue, in rebuttal, that the rankings are skewed by the large number of very poor undocumented immigrants who live along the Rio Grande, and that if those people were to be removed from the calculations, the state would rank much higher in quality of life. Whether the liberal critique of the state’s conservative policies is justified is something that will be explored during the remaining chapters of this book.

The People of Texas

In many ways, Texas is the classic American melting pot of different peoples, although it occasionally seems more like a boiling cauldron. The state was originally populated by various Native American tribes. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Spaniards conquered the land, and from the intermingling of the conquerors and the conquered came the “mestizos,” persons of mixed Spanish and Native American blood. In the nineteenth century, Anglos wrested the land from the heirs of the Spaniards. They often brought Black slaves with them. Soon waves of immigration arrived from Europe and Asia, and more mestizos came from Mexico. After a brief outflow of population as a result of the oil price depression of the late 1980s, the long-term pattern of immigration resumed and brought many more thousands during the 1990s and beyond.

The Census

At the end of each decade, the national government takes a census of each state’s population. Table 1-4 shows the official Texas numbers for 1990 to 2010. The increase in population indicated in the table entitled Texas to three additional seats in the U.S. House in 1990, two more in 2000, and another four in 2010, bringing the state’s total to thirty-six.

Besides the overall increase in population of 20.6 percent in the final decade of the twentieth century, the most significant fact revealed by the 2010 census was the rapid increase in Texas’s Hispanic population. Whereas Hispanics—the great majority of whom, in Texas, are either Mexican or Mexican American—constituted 21 percent of the state’s population in 1980 and 26 percent in 1990, by 2010 they totaled almost 38 percent. The other important minority group, African Americans, comprised 11.8 percent of the state’s citizens, a percentage that has not changed appreciably over the last several decades.

The inevitable consequence of the increasing trend-line of the Latino population arrived in 2005 when the Census Bureau announced an estimate that the population of Texas consisted of 50.2 percent Black and Latino people. The 2010 count confirmed that the falling Anglo percentage of the state population had continued, as that group, which used to be a large majority of the population, had dropped to 45.3 percent. In other words, there is now no “majority” ethnic group in the state; every group constitutes a minority of the population. If present population growth rates continue, however, a majority of Texas’s population will be Hispanic by 2020.
The distribution of the population in Texas shows evidence of three things: the initial patterns of migration, the influence of geography and climate, and the location of the cities. The Hispanic migration came first, north from Mexico, and to this day is still concentrated in South and West Texas, especially in the counties that border the Rio Grande. Likewise, African Americans still live predominantly in the eastern half of the state. As one moves from east to west across Texas, annual rainfall drops by about five inches per 100 miles. East Texas has a moist climate and supports intensive farming, while West Texas is dry and requires pumping from underground aquifers to maintain agriculture. The overall distribution of settlement reflects the food production capability of local areas, with East Texas remaining more populous. Cities developed at strategic locations, usually on rivers or the seacoast, and the state’s population is heavily concentrated in the urban areas.

The Political Relevance of Population

In this book Anglos, Mexican Americans, and African Americans often will be discussed as groups, without an intent to be unfair to individual exceptions. Our division of the Texas population into Anglos, Mexican Americans, and African Americans reflects political realities. All citizens are individuals, form their own opinions, and have the right to choose to behave as they see fit. No one is a prisoner of his or her group, and every generalization has exceptions. Nevertheless, it is a long-observed fact that people in similar circumstances often see things from similar points of view, and it therefore helps to clarify political conflict to be aware of the shared similarities.

Historically, both of the minority groups, Mexican Americans and African Americans, have been treated badly by the Anglo majority. Today, the members of both groups are, in general, less wealthy than Anglos. For example, according to the 2000 census, the mean household income of both Latinos and Blacks...
was about 62 percent of the figure for Anglos in the state. On the one hand, this represented a narrowing of the income gap between minorities and Anglos that existed in 1990. On the other hand, the difference in wealth was still very substantial and large enough to cause economic conflict. At the time of writing, wealth figures were not available from the 2010 census, but when released they will probably show a continuing economic difference between the ethnic groups.

Political differences often accompany economic divisions. As will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, Mexican Americans and African Americans tend to hold more liberal political opinions than do Anglos and to vote accordingly. This is not to say that there are no conservative minority citizens and no liberal Anglos. Nevertheless, when looked at as groups, Mexican Americans, African Americans, and Anglos do display general patterns of belief and behavior that can be discussed without being unfair to individual exceptions.

As a result, as the minority population increases in size relative to the Anglo population, its greater liberalism is likely to make itself felt, sooner or later, in the voting booth. Furthermore, Texans of Asian background are a relatively small, but growing proportion of the population. As their population becomes larger, they may exert an independent influence on the political process. Texas’s evolving mix of population is therefore constantly changing the state’s politics.

The Plan of This Book

The following chapters will examine the ways Texans organize and behave politically to attempt to deal with their social and economic problems. There will also be a cautious attempt to assess the state’s future prospects. Every chapter will contain a comparison of the reality of Texas politics to the democratic ideal and a discussion of how defensible the reality is.

The topics to be considered in the following chapters are, in order, the Texas Constitution, the state’s important interest groups, the activities of political parties, and the individual voter within the context of campaigns and elections. Next, the focus will shift to the institutions of state government—the legislature, the executive branch, and the judiciary. An examination of local government will follow and then analyses of state public policy; first, a discussion of various policy areas relating to “people,” and then an examination of some policy problems pertaining to “resources.” In both policy chapters, there will be some cautious attempts to assess future prospects for the relevant policy.

Summary

This chapter began with an overview of the history of Texas, with emphasis on important political events and the development of the economy. The discussion then shifted to the topic of democratic theory, which holds that the legitimacy of a government rests upon the citizens’ participation, and to the topic of Texas’s place in the American federal system and the international arena. The focus then moved to the state’s conservative political culture.

This chapter has explained how, as a result of its political culture, there is a preference in Texas for an individualistic worldview, a less-government-is-better approach, pseudo laissez faire, social Darwinism, and the trickle-down theory of economic and
social development. The twin results are an inactive government and a relatively poor quality of life compared to many other states. Texas has a large and diverse population that is always growing and changing. Insofar as the future can be predicted, it seems that the population will continue to grow, with an increasingly large non-Anglo, and especially Hispanic, component. These changes have affected, and will continue to affect, politics in Texas.

**Glossary Terms**

- conservatism
- democracy
- federal system
- impresario
- individualistic political culture
- laissez faire
- legitimacy
- liberalism
- moralistic political culture
- political culture
- pseudo laissez faire
- social Darwinism
- traditionalistic political culture
- trickle-down theory